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GLASS CAGES IN THE DOCK?:
PRESENTING THE DEFENDANT TO THE JURY
DAVID TAIT*
INTRODUCTION
A "fair" trial is typically understood to be one that offers a range of
procedural safeguards, such as: involving a public hearing before an inde-
pendent and impartial tribunal within a reasonable period; presenting the
accused with the evidence against him or her, with adequate opportunity to
prepare and present a defense; and allowing appeals against trial court deci-
sions.1 Further, in common law legal systems, having one's case heard by a
jury is a fundamental right for defendants charged with serious offences.
Fairness also has an architectural or spatial dimension. Courts are de-
signed not just to achieve functional objectives, such as adequate sightlines
and good acoustics, 2 but also to reflect values such as "trust, hope and most
importantly faith in justice and fairness."3 At the same time, design stan-
dards are likely to mandate security measures to protect different court
participants from harm. This article examines legal debates about one im-
portant design question-where fairness and security considerations may
appear to conflict at times-where and how to seat the accused. The article
focuses on trials in which a jury is present, which tend to be the most se-
* Justice Research Group, University of Western Sydney. Declaration of interest: the author was
called as a witness for the defense in the el Omar pre-trial hearings in Sydney, one of the cases referred
to below.
Several of the descriptions of court spaces in this article, in part, are based on the author's
personal observations of these spaces. Where possible, the author directs readers to other authorities for
photos or descriptions of these spaces.
1. See UNITED NATIONS, UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FINAL AUTHORIZED
TEXT, Article 10 (1952) ("Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an inde-
pendent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal
charge against him"); id. at Article 11 (1) ("Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the
guarantees necessary for his defence.").
2. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., U.S. COURTS DESIGN GUIDE, 14-1 (2007), available
at http://www.wbdg.org/ccb/GSAMAN/courts.pdf
3. See INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, Architect's Vision,
http://www.ice-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/About+the+Court/Permanent+Premises/TheBuilding/Architect/ E2
%80%99s+vision.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2011) (concerning the winning entry of architects, Bjarne
Hammer and Schmidt Hammer Lassen, for the International Criminal Court).
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rious matters because a person's liberty is often at stake, although similar
issues may also be raised in preliminary hearings or trials without juries.
The issue is a particularly fascinating one because of the radically dif-
ferent approaches jurisdictions have taken to the question. In the United
States, the accused generally appears free and unfettered in a privileged
position at the bar table. In Ireland and the Australian Capital Territory, the
accused sits just behind the bar table, also unconstrained. Meanwhile, in
France, Germany, England and Wales, and most parts of Australia, defen-
dants sit in a designated enclosure, and an increasing number of courts are
being built with glass-enclosed docks. In Spain and Italy (as well as nu-
merous jurisdictions that do not have juries), the accused may be located
behind metal bars in the courtroom.
These developments could be characterized as a story about how secu-
rity fears may trump individual rights and how the surveillance society has
turned the courtroom (in some countries at least) into an extension of the
prison. There is, however, another more optimistic counter-narrative that
can be recounted. This story is about how courts, spurred on by assertive
defense lawyers, have fought back to protect the rights of the accused and
have provided a more dignified court setting. Legal issues that were raised
in the United States, in the context of getting rid of the dock altogether,
reappeared in Europe and Australia in debates about placing the accused
within a glass-framed enclosure.
This article is in four parts. Part I provides a background to the devel-
opment of the dock in courtrooms, from about 1300 to 1850, as well as the
United States' experience of abolishing the dock since that period, outlin-
ing the court decisions that enabled and reinforced this change. Part II ex-
amines a particular form of dock, the glass-enclosed security dock,
reviewing its development and the way this was handled in two appeal
court processes, one at the European Court of Human Rights and one at the
Queensland Court of Appeal and the Australian High Court. Part III looks
at how two trial courts in Australian terrorism trials, in Victoria and New
South Wales, dealt with applications to remove the glass from the dock.
Part IV draws together the lessons from these case studies and develops
recommendations about how court design can better reflect fundamental
legal values.
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I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The Bar
In medieval times, a wooden barrier ("barreau," in English "bar")
served to designate the space within which justice was done.4 This judicial
space might be under a tree, as it was with the legendary judgments of
French kings. 5 In less clement climes, it could be a county hall, church, or
other public building. In the new world it was typically an upstairs room in
a tavern or any other available space large enough for the occasion.6
Initially the dedicated area would probably have contained the judge
and court officials; everyone else, including witnesses, defendants, jurors,
lawyers, and the public, remained outside. Litigants and defendants would
present themselves at "the bar."
Because courts were held in a variety of locations, the configurations
of justice spaces and the position of participants varied from place to place.
Sometimes the judge might allow others to venture inside the bar. In 1586
Mary Stuart (Queen of Scots) was placed inside the bar for her trial, to-
gether with the forty-four noblemen and gentry who were to vote on her
guilt, facing the empty chair for the absent Queen Elizabeth.7 Her grand-
son, King Charles I, sat outside the bar for his trial.8 He sat, however, close
enough to the lawyer, John Cook, who was prosecuting the case, to be able
to reach across the bar and strike the latter with his staff. The silver head of
his cane flew off and rolled on the floor.9 The position of the accused and
the role of lawyers in criminal trials were to be closely linked in the subse-
quent story. Indeed the term "bar" became associated with the lawyers
themselves, and the table at which they sat became the "bar table."
The layout of a courtroom is a reflection of a complex history of legal
reform, professional evolution, and political values. The dock, the bar table,
4. ROBERT JACOB, IMAGES DE LA JUSTICE: ESSAI SUR L'ICONOGRAPHIE JUDICIAIRE DU MOYEN
AGE A L'AGE CLASSIQUE [IMAGES OF JUSTICE: ESSAY ON JUDICIAL ICONOGRAPHY FROM THE MIDDLE
AGES TO THE CLASSIC AGE], 93-94 (1994).
5. ANTOINE GARAPON, BIEN JUGER: ESSAIS SUR LE RITUEL JUDICIAIRE [JUDGING WELL: ESSAYS
ON JUDICIAL RITUAL] 25 (1997).
6. MARTHA MCNAMARA, FROM TAVERN TO COURTHOUSE: ARCHITECTURE AND RITUAL IN
AMERICAN LAW, 1658-1860 1-2 (2004).
7. For one artist's impression of this trial configuration, see Robert Beale, Trial of Mary Queen
of Scots in the Grand Chamber at Fotheringay Castel, October 1586 at www.heritage.com, Image ID 1-
225-253.
8. Lynal E. Doerksen, Out of the Dock and Into the Bar: An Examination of the History and Use
of the Prisoner's Dock, 34 CRIM. L.Q., 478-502,485 (1989).




the witness stand, and the jury benches all encapsulate particular sets of
social relations, some bearing traces of earlier eras. For court regulars with-
in each tradition, the position of each of these players is seen as obvious
and inevitable; a comparison of different traditions shows this is far from
the case. The following sections provide a brief review of three different
histories-English, American, and French. Most other western court sys-
tems with jury trials use a variant of one of these.
B. Segregated Spaces in Courtsl0
Until the nineteenth century, jurors and witnesses in English courts are
likely to have intermingled with members of the public. Indeed on at least
one documented occasion, defendants awaiting trial became jurors for an
earlier case.II In the Old Bailey in the eighteenth century, the jury would
sometimes be scattered, some inside and some outside the bar, according to
the available space.12 In some New England courts, jurors occasionally
mingled with patrons of the taverns in which they were deliberating.13 In
France until 1789, criminal trials were held in secret, so there were no pub-
lic courts. 14
The nineteenth century saw the building of special-purpose courts in
the three countries, with spaces becoming more clearly demarcated. Desig-
nated areas for witnesses, defendants, and jurors developed during the first
part of the nineteenth century.15 In this process of differentiating spaces,
the area demarcated by the "bar" was extended to include all the major
players and to distinguish the participants from the spectators.
10. This summary is based on published sources available in English or French. Documentation
for many of the processes described is limited, and more definitive conclusions would require detailed
archival work, along the lines Katherine Taylor has done for the Palais de Justice in Paris. See generally
KATHERINE F. TAYLOR, IN THE THEATER OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE PALAIS DE JUSTICE IN SECOND
EMPIRE PARIS (1993).
I1. Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the United
States 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 867, 881 (1994).
12. John H. Langbein, The Criminal Trial before the Lawyers, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 288 (1978).
13. MCNAMARA, supra note 6, at 41.
14. The contrast between the secret trial and the public punishment, and the subsequent reversal of
this dichotomy is described most famously in MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH
OF THE PRISON (1977).
15. Katherine Fischer Taylor, First Appearances: The Material Setting and Culture of the Early
Supreme Court, in THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 357, 371
(Christopher Tomlins, ed., 2005).
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C. The Position of the Accused and the Role ofLawyers
In eighteenth century English courts, there were often enclosures for
accused persons or "bale-docks."' 6 The defendants awaiting trial would
stand together in the enclosure. Accused persons would move to the bar
when their cases were called, usually representing themselves.17
Defense lawyers were not generally accepted in criminal proceedings
until about 173018 and were not allowed to address the jury directly until
1836.19 The English legal profession developed as something of a caste
system, with higher-status barristers authorized to speak in court on behalf
of clients (at least for more serious matters); attorneys or solicitors met the
clients and took verbal instructions, relaying these to the barristers. This
distinction was reinforced by different work arrangements. Solicitors were
generally employees in a law firm, while barristers worked as self-
employed agents in "chambers." 20 Barristers could also act either for the
defense or the prosecution. 21 Prosecution and defense barristers sat side-by-
side at the bar table, close to their instructing solicitors.22 These profession-
als were now the main actors in the trial and occupied the center of the
court. The accused meanwhile had become less central to the case and
could be moved to the margins of the courtroom, typically in a dock at the
back.
The monopoly of barristers to speak in the court was slowly reduced,
in theory, in England and Wales and Australian states, although a divided
bar persists in practice in both places in the higher courts.23 In Canada,
Ireland, and New Zealand (other countries that largely inherited the English
model) the division between barristers and solicitors eroded to a greater
extent. In lower courts, the division between the two levels of the legal
profession never developed to the same extent. Solicitors typically
represented clients in these courts, often alongside police prosecutors, most
of whom were not legally trained.
In the nineteenth century, American courts largely followed English
court layouts and placed the accused in a dock. Like their English counter-
16. Doerksen, supra note 8, at 482.
17. Id.
18. Langbein, supra note 12, at 307.
19. John Beattie, Scales of Justice: Defense Counsel and the English Criminal Trial in the Eigh-
teenth and Nineteenth Centuries, 9 LAw & HIST. REV. 221, 231 (1991).
20. Id. at 221-31.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See generally JOHN EMERSON, A HISTORY OF THE INDEPENDENT BAR OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(2006).
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parts, American lawyers were developing specializations, including trial
attorney, but without the caste difference evident in England. They general-
ly worked in law firms as partners or employees. Defense attorneys who
defended a client in court also met their clients in person and took instruc-
tions directly; a dock removed from their table was therefore something of
an inconvenience. Prosecutors meanwhile were a separate occupational
group, employed directly by the state. Sitting next to them was not essential
to providing a competent defense, and the growing complexity of cases
meant more space was required. The opportunity to deal with both issues
together came at the end of the nineteenth century when the process of
segregating spaces led to the building of special-purpose grand jury rooms.
Before this time the grand jury used a courtroom, with two benches on
either side of the room to accommodate up to twenty-three jurors. Only one
set of benches was required to accommodate the twelve members of a trial
jury, so the other side could now be used by the defense lawyers and their
clients. How this transformation became not only possible, but also largely
obligatory is taken up in the following section.
In France after the Revolution, juries were introduced by the new re-
gime as part of a process of democratizing justice, so space was made
available for them. Not everything changed. Powerful prosecutors had been
a key feature of the pre-revolutionary justice process; the avocat gindral in
the new courts towered over the other court participants from a position
alongside the judges, the position where the king had sat in the parle-
ment.24 The defendant, meanwhile, generally had a designated bench or
box facing the jury, with an advocate alongside.25 The accused remained in
this enclosed area during questioning, not moving to the witness stand as
their common law counterparts did. But like the emerging United States
model, and in contrast to the English practice, this configuration managed
to combine co-location of defense lawyer and defendant, with a strong
spatial separation between prosecution and defense.
D. Abolishing the Dock in the United States
As American courts were built or redeveloped from the late nineteenth
century, the dock was quietly removed and defendants moved to the de-
fense table. This change was supported by a range of judicial decisions,
initially based on right to counsel, then expanding to include the dignity of
the accused, the presumption of innocence, and the right to a fair trial.
24 See TAYLOR, supra note 10.
25. Id.
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A 1914 court ruling in Pennsylvania held that a dock violated the de-
fendant's "common-law right" to consult his lawyer, 26 while in California
in 1944,27 a seating arrangement where defendants were not alongside their
lawyers was held to breach the state constitutional guarantee of right to
counsel.28
The rulings about dignity and the presumption of innocence came in
the 1970s and 1980s. In Illinois v. Allen in 1970, the U.S. Supreme Court
found that the use of shackles affronts the "dignity and decorum of judicial
proceedings that the judge is seeking to uphold."29 In Estelle v. Williams in
1976, the Court banned the use of prison garb in court as a violation of due
process rights.30 In 1983, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
found the presence of a dock to be prejudicial to the rights of the accused
person.31 The court deemed that a dock was a "brand of incarceration" that
they held to be "inconsistent with the presumption of innocence." 32 In Coy
v. Iowa in 1988, the Court held that an accused person should appear unfet-
tered before a jury, unless there were very strong reasons for doing other-
wise.33 Even in the penalty phase of a capital trial, where the person was
now legally guilty, the Supreme Court held in 2005 in Deck v. Missouri
that the dignity associated with the presumption of innocence now ap-
plied.34 Any form of visible restraint, or mark of confinement, whether
prison clothes, shackles, or a dock, would fall afoul of this test.35
Note that this is not a right for the accused to be unshackled; it is the
right to appear unconstrained before a jury. Stun belts not visible to the
jury were permissible, if required, and various forms of constraint in pre-
liminary hearings (such as handcuffs) were allowed.36 The right is therefore
about appearances-creating a dignified setting for the accused and avoid-
ing any impression that the accused is dangerous, guilty, or visibly differ-
ent. It is arguably the sensibilities of the jury that are being safeguarded
rather than the comfort of the accused.
26. Commonwealth v. Boyd, 92 A. 705 (Pa. 1914).
27. People v. Zammora, 152 P.2d. 180, 211-15 (Cal. 1944).
28. Steven Shepard, Should the Criminal Defendant Be Assigned a Seat in Court?, 115 YALE L.J.
2203, 2207 n. 22 (2006).
29. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344 (1970).
30. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 512-13 (1976).
31. Young v. Callahan, 700 F.2d 32, 36 (1 st Cir. 1983).
32. Shepard, supra note 28, at 2208.
33. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1021 (1988).
34. Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 628-29 (2005).
35. Id. at 633.




Courts retained the right to constrain the accused where there was an
immediate reason for doing so. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit allowed a dock in 1999, when there were clear "security con-
cerns." 37 Disruptive defendants may be restrained, the Allen court found,
but only as long as the disruption persists; however, if the disruption pers-
ists and the defendant cannot be controlled, the Allen court allowed for
removal of the defendant from the courtroom during the trial. 38 The dock
apparently remained in some courtrooms, to be used when required, but
slowly fell into disuse, so that by the early part of the twentieth century,
new courtrooms usually omitted them altogether. U.S. federal court guide-
lines make no provision for docks. Historical courts may retain docks for
antiquarian purposes. For example, Massachusetts does have some cour-
trooms with docks, which are reportedly never used for jury trials, 39 and
arraignment hearings sometimes make use of more secure areas within
courts for the accused.
II. GLASS AROUND THE DOCK: BACKGROUND AND DEBATES
Glass has a complex history as a building material, changing or even
reversing its meaning across time. This can be seen most clearly in hospital
design. Windows in open Nightingale wards brought light and air into the
ward, to clear away miasmas, a major fear at the time. 40 However, with the
development of germ theory toward the end of the nineteenth century, glass
took on quite a different role-to separate and isolate, thereby preventing
germs from spreading. Isolation cubicles were developed with glass to
permit observation by staff. Thus, it appeared that glass, which at one time
was a material indicating openness and movement, at a later period denoted
confinement and surveillance.
Both of these principles can be seen at work in court design. Expanses
of glass, such as those in the High Court of Australia, are seen as
representing a commitment to openness and accountability. In French cour-
trooms, light usually comes from above, most remarkably in the courtroom
pods of Richard Rogers' celebrated Bordeaux courthouse, indicating both
its link with truth and the need for accountability.4 1 However, the glass in
37. Shepard, supra note 28, at 2208 n. 25.
38. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343-44 (1970).
39. Interview with Andrea P. Leers, Dept. of Architecture, Harvard University, (July 30, 2008).
40. Lindsay Prior, The Architecture of the Hospital: A Study of Spatial Organization and Medical
Knowledge, 39 BRIT. J. Soc. 86, 94 (1988).
41. MINISTERE DE LA JUSTICE (FR.), LA NOUVELLE ARCHITECTURE JUDICIAIRE: DES PALAIS DE
JUSTICE MODERNES POUR UNE NOUVELLE IMAGE DE LA JUSTICE [THE NEW JUDICIAL ARCHITECTURE:
THE MODERN COURTHOUSE FOR A NEW IMAGE OF JUSTICE], 76-77 (2002).
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the roof is invisible; it acts to convey light, not to draw attention to itself.
At the other extreme, glass may become the focus of attention; the grandi-
ose architecture that constituted Mitterrand's legacy, such as Pei's pyramid
over the Louvre, made glass itself a spectacle. 42 Adventurous court archi-
tects have gone as far as giving glass the role that has traditionally been set
aside for wood; in Nanterre, even the bench and the witness stand are made
of glass. Glass, together with steel and concrete, became trademarks of the
international style introduced by the Bauhaus movement in architecture,
illustrated in the high-rise court complexes seen, for example, in Mies van
de Rohe's Dirksen Federal Building in Chicago, which was completed in
1964.
Three years before this building was completed, glass took on a new
meaning for justice, when Adolf Eichmann was placed in a bullet-proof
dock during his trial.43 What most photos of this fail to show is that this
glass cubicle, together with the judges and lawyers, was elevated on a
stage; the rest of the courtroom was really a theater.44 The dock was, thus,
analogous to the isolation cubicles of hospitals, permitting observation not
just by professionals, but also, thanks to the media, by the world. Cages had
been used in court before. For example, during a 1927 mafia trial in Sicily,
the defendants in their iron cages were made to look like "wild animals." 45
But after Eichmann, glass became an option for enclosing defendants in
high-profile cases while displaying them to the rest of the court. The trials
of the Papon war crimes (France), the Lockerbie bombings (Scottish court
in the Netherlands), and the Madrid train bombings (Spain) are the most
famous.
There are several interpretations for these glass cubicles, including
providing protection for the defendant against possible attack (most plausi-
ble with Maurice Papon who was already 87 years of age), making the
defendant an exhibit or spectacle in the trial (most clearly the case with
Adolf Eichmann), hinting at dangerousness (as the Time reporter had sug-
gested for the 1927 mafia trials), 46 and, as with isolation cubicles of late
nineteenth century hospitals, permitting maximum surveillance of the ac-
42. Annette Fierro, THE GLASS STATE: THE TECHNOLOGY OF THE SPECTACLE, 164-65 (2003).
43. See generally HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF
EVIL (1963) (showing that Eichmann's trial was a show trial). For a photo of the Eichmann trial court,
see Yad Vashem, Trial of Adolf Eichmann, Jerusalem 1961, available at
http://havana506O.blogspot.com/search?q-vashem.
44. Id.






cused person. However, it appears that most of the pressure to build glass-
enclosed docks arose from security concerns. Any impact on the accused or
the jury was unforeseen and probably unintended.
There are various configurations of glass-enclosed docks. In general
terms (recognizing that these simplified templates overlap and may not fit
every case), these are the models that can be seen most frequently in cour-
trooms that use glass in the dock.
* Glass box. A cube with glass on all sides containing the defen-
dant (and security staff). The Eichmann trial in Jerusalem is the
most famous example of this design. Several modern French
courts use this template, with space enough for several defen-
dants and a couple of gendarmes.
* Glass-fronted bunker. The dock is set into the wall, with a strip
of glass connecting the dock to the courtroom. This was the
configuration of the courtroom provided for the Sydney terror-
ism trial and appears to be the model used in some newer Eng-
lish courts.47
* Glass demarcated court zones. Glass screens are used to sepa-
rate areas for defendants from those used by other court partici-
pants from those used by the public. A prominent example of
this is in the special high-security courthouse used for terrorism
trials in Diisseldorf.4 8 In this courtroom design, the sheets of
glass do not fully enclose the accused.
* Glass-fringed docks. The front or side of the dock may be retro-
fitted with one or more sheets of glass. This can vary from a
short strip of glass providing an ornamental embellishment (as
in one of the restored courtrooms of the Victorian Supreme
Court), to battlement-style sheets bolted to the wooden base
with slits for passing documents (used in several South Austral-
ian courts), to concertina-style glass screens provided in several
Adelaide courts, which can be folded out if required. This style
may include defendant enclosures with glass toward the public
side (but not toward the jury), such as those used for the three
French war crimes trials of Touvier, Papon and Barbie, shiel-
47. LINDA MULCAHY, LEGAL ARCHITECTURE: JUSTICE, DUE PROCESS AND THE PLACE OF LAW,
76 (2011).
48. See Life Magazine (photograph), at http://www.1ife.com/image/96978717.
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ding the aging defendants from possible objects thrown from the
public gallery.49
* Fishbowl court. This is not a dock as such, but a configuration
in which all the courtroom participants are inside the glass en-
closure and the public views the proceedings through the glass.
This is the arrangement in the two war crime tribunals in The
Hague, and the Duch trial in Cambodia, but it can also be seen
ii a range of domestic courts such as some of the Cook County
courtrooms in Chicago.
A. Appeals Against a Glass-enclosed Dock
If putting the accused in any enclosed space affronted American legal
sensibilities, it was not until the accused was put in a glass cage that Euro-
pean and Australian courts addressed the issue. In both places, the initial
cases allowed the existing arrangements to continue.
The year 1994 saw two appeals against the use of glass cages in
courts. One was in Strasbourg at the European Court of Human Rights,
involving the United Kingdom, or more specifically England, the source of
the common law. The other was in Brisbane, at the Queensland Court of
Criminal Appeals, a matter which later came before the High Court of Aus-
tralia.
B. European Court ofHuman Rights Judgments
A glass-enclosed dock was the focus of the Stanford case against the
U.K. at the European Court of Human Rights in 1994.50 An applicant
claimed he had been denied a fair trial in Norwich because he could not
hear all the evidence against him, due to being in a "glass-fronted dock."51
This is likely to have been similar to the glass-fringed dock described
above, with glass retro-fitted to a dock placed near the back of the room.
While recognizing the right of the defendant to "hear and follow the pro-
ceedings" and accepting that the defendant did have difficulties hearing the
evidence, the court ruled that counsel should have brought this matter to the
attention of the trial judge at the time. 52 Since there was no evidence that
the lawyer had failed to provide a competent defense, the court would not
49. See Noelle Herrenschmidt, Image no2: Courtroom, Papon Trial, Law Courts in Bordeaux
(1997) (watercolor), available at http://traitsdejustice.bpi.fr/home.phpid=52.
50. Stanford v. U.K. (No. 16757/90), Eur. Ct. of H.R. (1994).
51. Id at 7.
52. Id. at 26.
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intervene. 53 Nevertheless, the court agreed that a fair trial did require that a
person be able to hear the evidence presented against him or her.54 To the
extent that a glass screen limited the person's ability to hear, this may have
constituted a violation of what, in the United States context, would have
been seen as confrontation rights.
If restricting hearing was one objection to glass screens, paradoxically,
allowing hearing was a second problem the European Court of Human
Rights found with glass screens. In an earlier case in 1991 involving Swit-
zerland, the court, dealing in this matter with lawyer-client communication
in a detention facility rather than a court, had re-affirmed the rights of
clients to confidential communications with their lawyers. 55 In 2007, in
Castravet v. Moldova, the court applied this principle to glass screens.56 It
found that the lack of opportunity for the client to talk to his lawyer "with-
out being separated by a glass partition" constituted a violation of the "right
to defence." 57 There was some evidence that security staff could overhear
the conversations, or, at least, there were reasonable grounds for suspecting
this was happening.58 In a previous matter that came before the court, also
involving Moldova, a detainee had been questioned by security staff about
complaints he had made about the facility in private to his lawyer.59 "The
[c]ourt concluded that the impossibility for the applicant to discuss with his
lawyers issues directly relevant to his defence and to his appeal against
detention, without being separated by a glass partition, affected his right to
defence, in violation of Article 5 § 4."60
In 2007, the European Court of Human Rights considered yet another
case involving Moldova.61 In this case, Sarban v. Moldova, the accused
was placed in a "cage," made of not just glass, but also metal bars.62 Added
to this were visible restraints in the form of handcuffs and the additional
humiliation of medical treatment administered in public view,63 both of
53. Id. at 30.
54. Id. at 32.
55. S. v. Switzerland (No. 13965/88), Eur. Ct. of H.R. 48-50 (1991); see also Brennan v. United
Kingdom (No. 39846/98), Eur. Ct. of H.R. 67 (2001).
56. Castravet v. Moldova (No. 23393/05), Eur. Ct. of H.R. 60 (2007).
57. Id.
58. Oferta Plus S.R.L. v. Moldova (No. 14385/04), Eur. Ct. of H.R. 50 (2006).
59. Modirch v. Moldova (No. 14437/05) Eur. Ct. of H.R. 44 (2005).
60. Id at 8.
61. Sarban v. Moldova (No. 3456/05), Eur. Ct. of H.R. (2005).
62. Id. at 88.
63. Id.
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which would have fallen short of the "dignity and decorum" rule identified
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Allen.64 In Sarban, the court noted that
Mr. Sarban was brought in handcuffs to court and held in a cage during
the hearings, even though he was under guard and was wearing a surgic-
al collar around his neck. His doctor had to measure his blood pressure
through the bars of the cage in front of the public. The Court held that
such safety measures were unwarranted and were humiliating. All those
acts took place in full view of the media.65
Together with the failure to provide medical treatment when required, these
acts constituted degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the
European Charter of Human Rights, the section prohibiting inhuman treat-
ment or punishment.66
C. Queensland Court ofAppeal: The Case
The same year the European Court of Human Rights deliberated the
acceptability of a glass dock in Stanford, the Queensland Court of Criminal
Appeal considered a case that involved the accused being placed not only
inside a floor-to-ceiling glass screen but also shackled with handcuffs at-
tached to a body-belt. 67 In this case, Farr and five colleagues were accused
of beating a fellow inmate to death inside a maximum-security prison.68
Most of the witnesses were to appear similarly constrained by handcuffs
attached to a body belt.69 The issue was balancing the right to a fair trial for
the accused on the one hand with security of the courtroom on the other.70
The court examined several objections to the security arrangements: pow-
ers of the trial judge, current need, possibility of alternatives, and impact on
the jury.7' The three judges agreed that any doubt about the matter should
be resolved in favor of the decision made by the trial judge:
It is obviously proper to approach the question raised here with a power-
ful predisposition in [favor] of the correctness of the directions given by
the judge who is to preside at the trial ... It is not for us to be unduly
courageous about risks that do not threaten us personally. 72
64. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344 (1970).
65. Sarban, supra note 61, at 88.
66. Id. at 104.
67. R v. Farr [1994] QCA 266, 2 (Austl.).
68. Id. at 14-15.
69. Id. at 2.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1-3.
72. Id. at 7-8 (JA McPherson).
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Here, the court reasoned that the trial judge was in the ideal position to
"gauge the extent of security precautions which are necessary in the cir-
cumstances" and had the necessary authority to make the decision, and an
appellate court should intervene only "in the most exceptional of circums-
tances."73 The authority of the judge in administrative (as opposed to judi-
cial) matters was "absolute," and the judge had no obligation even to con-
consider defense applications to vary them. 74
The measures were necessary because one or more of the accused had
been involved in a violent altercation in a previous phase of the case, which
had been video-recorded and shown first to the trial judge, and then to the
appeal bench.75 The only alternative to the use of the glass cage was re-
portedly manacling of the feet, something the trial judge had considered,
but dismissed as "barbarous." 76 The appellate judges saw the two options
as being "very largely one of opinion" and not a matter on which they
should consider over-ruling the trial judge.7 7
The final issue the court considered was the likely impact on the jury.
In considering security precautions in court, the High Court had previously
ruled that such precautions should be "no more obvious than necessary"
and that every attempt should be made "to avoid or mitigate the prejudicial
effect which such precautions may have on the mind of the jury."78 Given
that the accused, and most of the witnesses, were maximum security pris-
oners and that the matter involved the killing of a fellow inmate, it was
argued that the jury would not find it surprising to see the accused in hand-
cuffs and body belts. 79 The trial judge had taken all possible steps to miti-
gate any prejudicial effect by ensuring that all the witnesses from the prison
were presented in a similar manner; this would avoid the accused looking
different from their peers.80
At the trial, the jury found four of the accused guilty.81 Three of them
appealed to the Queensland Court of Appeal.82 The appeals court found
that one of the convictions was unsafe (on technical grounds) and ordered a
retrial, while one of the judges wrote a dissenting statement, arguing that
73. Id at 18 (J Williams).
74. Id. at 6 (JA McPherson).
75. Id at 10.
76. Id at 11.
77. Id.
78. Smith v. The Queen, 159 CLR 532, 532 (1985).
79. Farr, [1994] QCA 266 at 10-11.
80. Id. at 8 (JA McPherson).
81. SeeR v. Alexanderson, 86 A. Crim. R 77, 2 (1996).
82. Id
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all three convictions should be overturned.83 This dissenting judge, Justice
Dowsett, commented on the security arrangements, stating "Although our
law insists that accused persons are innocent until proven guilty, that does
not mean that in all of the arrangements incidental to their management in
custody and at trial, such an assumption must be made."84
The presumption of innocence did not need, in his view, to inform the
design of the courtroom. Nevertheless, this was a dissenting view not ger-
mane to the key issues, and in the context of a statement that found many
other aspects of the trial unfair. Justice Dowsett provided his response to
the claim that a fair trial had been compromised:
To an extent, the appellants' argument depends upon an assumption of
naivety in juries, which assumption I believe to be unjustified. It assumes
that a jury is unable to understand that the judicial system may decide to
protect the public against the risk that a person may be dangerous even
where there is a real possibility that he is not. My own experience sug-
gests that jurors are worldly enough to understand that while the Crown,
in prosecuting an accused person, is asserting that there is evidence suf-
ficient to justify a conviction, the jury must determine whether or not
that conclusion is the correct one in the circumstances. If juries cannot
understand that, then our whole system is based upon a false premise. If
jurors are capable of understanding that basic proposition, then there is
no reason to believe that they are not also able to understand that security
arrangements at a trial may reflect one possible view of the evidence and
nothing more. 85
There are several assertions that deserve attention here. One is the
claim that jurors would not be influenced by unusual security arrange-
ments; they were "worldly enough" not to draw inferences about guilt from
the courtroom configuration.86 The second interesting statement is the
source of evidence for this claim: the judge's own personal experience, or,
rather, his experience of watching juries.87 The third point is that the secu-
rity arrangements reflect "one possible view of the evidence," namely, the
prosecution's case that the person on trial is guilty, rather than the court's
evaluation that the accused might be disruptive or violent in the courtroom.
These three claims are relevant in this context because they were issues that
were raised again in the two terrorism trials discussed below.
83. Id at 14,21.
84. Alexanderson, [1996] QCA 41, 78 (Austl.) (J. Dowsett, dissenting).
85. Id. at 78-79.
86. Id at 78.
87. Id.
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A footnote to the trial was an application to the High Court of Austral-
ia, Australia's highest court of appeal, for special leave to bring the case to
the court. This case was not accepted. However it did involve an exchange
between the lawyer for the prisoners and one of Australia's most eminent
jurists, Michael Kirby.
Justice Kirby noted three principles relevant to the matter: any securi-
ty measures should be no more than necessary, they should not interfere
with a fair trial, and they must not threaten the inherent dignity of the ac-
cused.88 The first two principles had been well established; the concept of
"inherent dignity" may have been implicit in the earlier debates, but it was
Justice Kirby, drawing on international human rights language, who made
this an explicit principle. The lawyer for the accused argued that an ankle
restraint in an ordinary dock (i.e., a dock without the Perspex frame) would
have been sufficient.89 This was an option previously considered by the
Queensland Court of Appeal and regarded as a "matter of opinion" that was
properly in the domain of the trial judge.90 The High Court similarly ac-
cepted the view that the trial judge was in the best position to consider the
specific facts of the case and make a decision.91 As Justice Kirby put it
I am sympathetic to the point that you are making, but I just do not see
that there is much enlightenment that could be given by this Court on
such a matter. It is inherently something that depends on the particular
facts, the nature of the event that has led to the security and the particular
restraints used in a particular case.92
A similar statement could have been made in Allen or Deck; the trial
judge had access to the relevant information and knew the particular facts
of the case in more intimate detail than any appeal court could. Yet, the
U.S. Supreme Court overturned the decisions in those cases. What was
different was the standard required for the Australian High Court to take on
the case. In the submission of the barrister leading the case: "the special
leave point is that it was not within the discretion of the trial judge to apply
that kind of restraint." 93 Since the Queensland Court of Appeal and a long
line of authorities established that a trial judge did indeed have this power,
it took a brave lawyer to make such a case. The substantial issue of whether
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the security arrangements breached fair trial standards was not under con-
sideration.
There are some factual differences between Farr and the U.S. cases.
Farr and his colleagues had already displayed violent behavior in court so
they could be argued to have been a current danger to others, which was
not present in the U.S. cases reviewed. Further, the judge in the Farr case
considered very specific evidence about the accused and developed a cus-
tomized approach, not one based on general categories or speculative infe-
rences. However, using the same absolute administrative power and
specific information about the accused in these cases, trial judges in two
other Australian states reached a different conclusion and ordered the re-
moval of glass screens around the dock.94 In these cases, Benbrika and
Baladjam, effectively the appeal processes did not resolve the substance of
the issue; instead, the appellate judges endorsed the same general principles
that the U.S. Supreme Court and the European Court of Human Rights had
espoused, leaving the matter in the hands of trial judges. 95 These cases are
discussed in more depth in the next section.
D. Islamic Terrorist Cases and the Glass Cage: Benbrika and Baladjam
In two Australian cases, Benbrika and Baladjam, a group of Muslim
men in Sydney and Melbourne were charged under federal anti-terrorism
legislation developed in response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist inci-
dents in the United States.96 The prosecution in these cases argued that the
men were conspiring to carry out terrorist incidents and produced circums-
tantial evidence based on telephone intercepts, sales of chemical and other
materials, and digital material found on the men's computers, including
beheading videos. 97 In Benbrika, twelve of the men were tried in Mel-
bourne. In Baladjam, five were tried in Sydney. The courtrooms were,
therefore, readied for multiple defendants, both during the long pre-trial
process and the trial itself.98
94. See R v. Benbrika, 182 A. Crim. R 205, 226 (2008) (Austl.); R v. Baladjam et al., [2008]
NSWSC 1462, 22 (Austl.).
95. See Benbrika, 182 A. Crim. R at 220-23; Baladjam, [2008] NSWSC at 21-28.
96. Baladjam, [2008] NSWSC at 19.
97. Id. at 19-20.
98. The Sydney terrorism trial itself will be referred to as
Regina (C'Wealth) v el-Omar & Ors [2010] NSWSC 10 (Austl.), while the pre-trial process will be
referred to as R v. Baladjam et al., [2008] NSWSC 1462 (Austl.). Omar Baladjan was the first-listed
accused during the lengthy pre-trial process. Before the actual trial, the name of the case changed to that
of another accused (el-Omar) because Defendant Baladjam pleaded guilty after the pre-hearing stage.
Because this article focuses on pre-trial process, i.e. the debate about the glass dock, I refer to Balad-
jam, i.e., the pre-trial stages, in most contexts.
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In both cases the court authorities used glass in the dock, but in
somewhat different ways. The dock in Melbourne could be described as a
glass box, or, rather, a series of Perspex (transparent thermoplastic) boxes,
located at the back of the courtroom, consistent with the Victorian conven-
tion for courtroom layout. The Perspex (hereafter, "glass") was retro-fitted
into the Victorian County Court's ceremonial courtroom, the only cour-
troom large enough to house the twelve accused, fifteen jurors (three spares
to allow for attrition over a long trial), fifteen counsel plus instructing soli-
citors, and a sizeable number of security guards. The dock modification
was a temporary arrangement, scheduled for removal at the end of the trial.
Each of the accused was placed in an individual pod, with an additional
seat for a guard, surrounded on three sides by glass, which was about 1.8
meters high. Pre-trial argument lasted thirteen months, and the trial itself
lasted seven months. Of the twelve men on trial, seven were found guilty,
four were acquitted, and the jury was unable to reach a verdict for the re-
maining one.
The dock in the Sydney West Trial Courts was a glass-fronted bunk-
er-in the judge's words, a "glassed-in room to the side of the court." 99
Following general practice of New South Wales, the dock was at the side
of the court facing the jury, with the courtroom purpose-built for high secu-
rity trials. All the accused sat together in the dock, initially nine during the
eight months of pre-trial argument and then five for the ten months of the
trial.
The trial in Melbourne, the Benbrika case, was held first. The defense
team argued that the arrangements were "burdensome and oppressive,"
bringing together the arguments used in most of the European Court of
Human Rights cases about lawyer-client communications, the matter of
personal comfort of the accused raised in the U.S. Supreme Court case of
Crawford and the Queensland Court of Appeal case of Farr, together with
the argument about the presumption of innocence developed most fully in
Deck.100 The prosecution did not oppose the application, although Correc-
tions Victoria was allowed to argue its case for retaining the current ar-
rangements. In doing so, the agency did not produce specific evidence
about the classification of individual defendants, but based its argument on
general considerations, such as the charges defendants faced and their sup-
posed links to international terrorist organizations.' 0 '
99. Baladjam, [2008] NSWSC at 2.
100. R v. Benbrika, [2007] VSC 524, 5-6 (2007).
101. Id. at 7.
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The court accepted the defense arguments, and the glass screens were
ordered to be removed.102 Justice Bongiorno recalled, as his Queensland
predecessors had done, that as trial judge he had "absolute authority" in
matters of security, though he qualified this by saying that such authority
should be exercised in order to promote a fair trial. 103 He found that the
screen arrangement isolated "the dock and its occupants from the body of
the Court" making it impossible for a client to talk to his lawyer unless the
latter entered the dock, while also impeding communication between the
accused themselves 104-an issue not previously raised in the other cases
examined here.
Comfort was also a concern. The "cells" in which the accused were
placed were cramped with "the occupant's knees ... jammed hard against
the Perspex necessitating frequent postural adjustment to achieve even a
moderate degree of comfort."105 But it was not just physical comfort that
was addressed in the judicial ruling. Visual comfort was also considered,
with the restricted visibility resulting from TV monitors in the dock being a
source of concern. 106
In protecting the opportunity for the accused to talk to each other, the
trial judge was addressing the psychological needs of the accused, an issue
he dealt with in more detail when he ruled on transport, screening, and
prison accommodation issues. 107 One of these rulings reported on psychia-
tric problems two of the accused faced, apparently precipitated by the harsh
conditions.108 He gave an ultimatum to the state Department of Justice,
ordering them to improve the treatment of the accused, or the trial would
not proceed.109 This conflict between the court and the department reflect-
ed the latter's focus on security considerations, at the expense of what Jus-
tice Kirby in Farr had referred to as "inherent dignity."110 The ruling
contained an extensive review of relevant English cases, and a reference to
a judgment of the European Court of Human Rights.I 1
102. Id. at 11-12.
103. Id. at 10.
104. Id. at 4, 12-13.
105. Id. at 4.
106. Id. at 11.
107. See e.g., Benbrika, 182, A. Crirn. R at 216-17.
108. Id. at 218.
109. In Australia state corrections authorities have custody of federal prisoners; there are no federal
prisons.
110. Farr v The Queen, [1996] HCA Trans 252 (Austl.) available at
http://portsea.austlii.edu.aulau/other/HCATrans/1996/252.html.
111. Benbrika, 182, A. Crim. R at 218-22.
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Justice Bongiorno found that the arrangement of the dock would "ma-
terially diminish" the right of the accused to "the presumption of inno-
cence." 1l2 He reviewed the submission of the defense to remove the
screens:
[The defense lawyer] submitted that, given the level of security pro-
posed, it would be difficult for a jury to be persuaded that they were not
being asked to convict the accused in circumstances where "the authori-
ties" or "the Government" had already decided they were a danger to the
community-thus causing severe and irremediable prejudice to their
case. 113
Thus the impression left on the jury by how the defendants were
seated in court was a key consideration, as it had been in Allen, Crawford,
Deck, and other U.S. Supreme Court and lower court decisions on which
they were based. In this case it was the glass cages that were at issue rather
than the presence of a dock as such, but the issue of likely jury response
was the same. Justice Dowsett, in the Queensland Court of Appeal, had
dismissed this argument, claiming that jurors were "worldly enough" to
distinguish between the message given by the security precautions that the
accused were dangerous and the instructions of the court that they were to
be presumed innocent.1 14 Bongiorno took a different view.
The Baladjam pre-trial processl 5 was, in a sense, the second chapter
of Benbrika. The Baladjam pre-trial involved defendants who were alleged
to be members of the same terrorist group, and the defendants had the same
prosecution team led by the same prosecutor acting for the Commonwealth
Department of Public Prosecutions. Justice Whealy had spent some time in
Melbourne with his counterpart to develop some of the logistics of manag-
ing a long and complex trial. So it was not surprising that the rights to a
screen-free dock given to the accused in Melbourne should be similarly
afforded to their counterparts in Sydney. There were, however, a couple of
differences between the two cases.
In Sydney, the courtroom in the Sydney West Trial Courts had been
specifically designed for such cases, and the dock followed the design brief
specified by the state government. It was not a temporary fixture. However
the design guidelines prescribed double docks, comprising both a glassed-
in and an open area, with the Court able to place the accused where it
112. Benbrika, [2007] VSC at 12.
113. Id. at 6.
114. Alexanderson, [1996] QCA 41, 78 (J. Dowsett, dissenting).
115. For an explanation of the Baladjam pre-trial process versus the actual trial as the terms are
used in this article, see supra note 98.
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deemed appropriate. Given the space constraints for a dock that could ac-
commodate a dozen defendants, this particular courtroom had only the
glassed-in dock.
A second unusual feature of the dock in Sydney was the lack of ade-
quate provision for lawyers to talk confidentially to their clients. In Mel-
bourne, the lawyer had to go into the dock, but could at least talk privately.
In other high-security courts (such as that in Disseldorf), gaps in the glass
allow lawyers to speak in confidence to their clients. In the Sydney high-
security courtroom the lawyer had to go into a cubicle alongside the dock
(like a telephone box) and talk through a mouthpiece to the client, with the
conversation often audible to others in the dock including security person-
nel. To attract the attention of counsel, an accused person had to knock
against the glass or engage in what one of the lawyers described (and the
judge repeated in his ruling) as "histrionic waving."ll 6
Like Justice Bongiomo in Benbrika, Justice Whealy considered visual
issues associated with the arrangement of the dock.11 7 The sightlines were
limited by the design of the dock, with solid wall both below and above the
slit of glass that connected the bunker to the courtroom. Unlike other glass
docks (such as those in the Eichmann trial), which emphasized visibility,
the bunker design restricted both the view out from the dock and the view
into it from the jury box, the bench, and the public gallery.
In reaching his decision to have the glass removed, Justice Whealy re-
peated the arguments made in Victoria, identifying the right to a fair trial
and communication with lawyers as being compromised by the arrange-
ments. 118 The jury would see this difficult communication, which, together
with the screens themselves, would create the impression that the men were
"dangerous."ll 9 As in Victoria, he dismissed Corrective Services argu-
ments about dangerousness that was generic rather than specific to each of
the accused.120 But he went further in several of his remarks, which dis-
played recognition of the wider social and political context of the trial.121
He foresaw a jury group that was influenced not just by their everyday
experiences, but by expectations of courts formed by television. However,
it was not popular television programs such as CSI or The Bill that he was
116. Baladjam, [2008] NSWSC at 3.
117. Id at 1-2.
118. Id. at 25-26.
119. Id. at 26.
120. Id at 24.
121. Id at 27.
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thinking of. The jurors would associate the glass screens with real trials
elsewhere:
Images of other trials in far distant countries will inevitably present
themselves to members of the jury when they first see the situation of the
accused behind a fixed screen. 122
The "far distant countries" were not specified. But the reference to
other legal systems suggests that negative associations with the design of
the dock might extend beyond the individuals in the glass cage to the jus-
tice system that placed them there. Thus, it was not just the credibility of
the defendants that could be at stake, it was also the legitimacy of the court
itself.
The judge reviewed the potential prejudice against the accused that
could result from their own choices; he mentioned specifically that they did
not stand up when the judge entered or left the room, and he referred to
their beards and Islamic costume. 123 This placed them at a disadvantage
from the outset. But rather than dismissing these as self-inflicted problems,
he argued that the court should counter the prejudicial effect of the defen-
dants' own behavior by removing the "layer of prejudice" that was within
its control-the design of the dock. 124
Their dress and appearance may present them as 'outsiders.'. . . In my
opinion, the presence of the glass screen is but one more layer of preju-
dice (perhaps one that is more significant than any of the others), and it
is an aspect of prejudice that can be avoided altogether by relatively sim-
ple and comparatively inexpensive means. 125
Like Justice Bongiorno, he was doubtful that jurors would be able to
put aside any prejudice resulting from the glass screens.126 Further, he was
skeptical that judicial instructions could cure this problem.
Generally I take the view that juries pay heed to the trial judge's direc-
tion. But I do not feel entirely comfortable, or by any means satisfied,
that directions regarding the presence of the fixed screen would be suffi-
cient.127
What evidence did he have about the likely impact of the screen on ju-
rors? In the absence of any conclusive evidence, he drew on his own pers-
122. Id. at 26.
123. Id. at 27.
124. Id.
125. Id
126. Id. at 25-26.
127. Id. at 27.
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pective as "an experienced trial judge," and "while they should not be de-
terminative," his own personal impressions. He stated:
I must confess that when I first saw the fixed screen dock I was imme-
diately concerned about its impact on the jury. Similarly, when I first
saw the accused in the fixed screen dock, I was rather taken aback by the
apparent separation of the accused from everybody else in the cour-
troom. The immediate impression was that they were separated in that
way because they posed a threat to people in the courtroom.... Even ju-
rors who have not been in a criminal trial before are likely to be startled
by the presence of a completely separate dock. 128
The impressions were similar to those expressed by members of the
defense team, also based on their own experience. The prosecution focused
their arguments on other matters, such as the "permanent" nature of the
dock and its consistency with court planning protocols.129 But in the end
the arrangements for presenting the accused to the jury were modified
based on how the judge thought the jury might respond.130
Thus, in both major terrorism trials in Australia where court authori-
ties had sought to place the accused behind glass screens, trial judges, at the
instigation of defense teams, had ordered the glass removed. These deci-
sions confirmed that Australian judges were able and willing to intervene in
the layout of courts in order to protect the defendants' right to a fair trial.
While both judges were careful to state that their decisions applied just to
those cases, the relevance of their arguments to all jury trials where defen-
dants are placed in glass cages can scarcely be doubted. Indeed, the ex-
treme circumstances in Farr and the availability since that case of less
visible means of constraint, underlines how much glass cages can violate
basic principles of dignity and the presumption of innocence laid down by
courts in the United States, Europe, and Australia over many years.
CONCLUSION
A. The Routine Use of Glass Cages
It can be argued, as the New South Wales court design guidelines do,
that flexible dock arrangements should be provided, allowing judges to
decide in the circumstances of each case whether the accused should be in
the open or closed dock. This is consistent with the control judges have, in
Australia and in other common law countries, over their courtrooms. As the
128. Id. at 22.
129. Id. at 23.
130. Id. at 28.
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U.S. Supreme Court opined in Allen, the judge should use constraint of the
defendant for the minimum time necessary and can choose between con-
straints within the courtroom or removal of the accused from the court
completely when there is an impossibly disruptive witnesses. 131
One of the features of all three Australian cases reviewed was the way
the trial judge decided the matter on the specific facts of that case, re-
stating the principle that each case should be handled according to its spe-
cific set of facts. The implications of these decisions for routine use of
glass screens injury trials are quite significant. They suggest that the sever-
ity of the charges, or the security classification used in prison, are not rele-
vant to the decision to use a glassed-in dock in court. Only specific
information about current danger or potential disruption by the particular
individual is relevant, and it must be substantial enough to outweigh the
possible prejudice produced by the extra constraint. In Farr, there was clear
evidence in the eyes of the trial judge, and the court upheld on appeal, that
at least some of the accused could be dangerous in the courtroom. In Ben-
brika and Baladjam, the trial judges found that the accused could be ma-
naged with less severe security measures. In the absence of specific
evidence about dangerousness or potential disruption, this argument runs,
the accused should be as unconstrained as possible. In some jurisdictions
this means sitting in an open dock; in the U.S. it means sitting at the bar
table. If defense lawyers take up this matter, there are likely to be a consi-
derable number of challenges to the default use of security docks in several
states of Australia, New Zealand, England and Wales, and in several prov-
inces of Canada. While French, German, and other civil law countries do
not endow presiding judges with "absolute" power over their courtrooms,
the link between a fair trial and the way the accused are presented in court
has been established by European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence as
discussed above.
Using the common law standards outlined above, it may be that jury
trials that use glass docks, such as are used in places like England and
Wales, France, and Spain may be found unfair. For example, in France, a
glassed-in defense dock may be particularly oppressive, both because the
accused does not move to an open witness box during questioning and also
because the accused typically plays a more active part in the trial than in
jurisdictions that follow a common law tradition. Ironically, in the two
Australian states where the challenges to the glass docks came, Victoria
and New South Wales, most jury trials do not involve the use of glass
131. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344 (1970).
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screens around the dock, although glass may be used between the public
gallery and the courtroom.
Most of the cases discussed here have dealt with occasions when a
jury is present, so any extension of the principles to non-jury trials or pre-
liminary stages of jury trials would have to be considered separately. How-
ever, the European Court of Human Rights cases reviewed here. -
Stanford, Castravet, and Sarban-did deal with non-jury matters in relation
to confidential communication with lawyers and the inherent dignity of the
person. So, these aspects of the right to a fair trial may at least have general
application.
B. The Right to a Fair Trial-Subject to Good Behavior?
The general import of the cases reviewed in this article was that plac-
ing the accused in a glass cage could undermine the presumption of inno-
cence. However, given the power of the trial judge to control the security of
his or her courtroom, this could mean that only orderly defendants, or those
deemed at low risk of violence within the courtroom, might benefit from
this presumption. So does this mean that the presumption of innocence is a
qualified right, one based on the behavior of the defendants themselves? If
they are deemed to be dangerous, as Farr and his colleagues were found to
be,132 then the defendants may have only themselves to blame for any pre-
judice the jury might feel toward them. If they are generally well-behaved,
as the accused in the two Australian terrorism cases were found to be, then
the extra "layer of prejudice" produced by the glass screens may be re-
moved.133 In other words, only some defendants are entitled to have their
inherent dignity reflected in the courtroom setting and to the benefit of the
presumption of innocence. This runs counter to the principle that Justice
Whealy outlined: it is precisely defendants whose own actions make them
seen as outsiders that courts should most diligently seek to protect, by re-
moving "layers of prejudice" that are within their control.134
This dilemma can be addressed, if not solved completely, by provid-
ing security in less obtrusive ways. Where an accused person is disruptive,
the preferred option might be considered-linking the accused to the court
by video link. A second channel (phone or electronic messaging) could be
available for ongoing private communication with lawyers.
132. Farr, QCA 266 at 10.
133. Baladjam, [2008] NSWSC at 24-25, 28; Benbrika, 182 A Crim R at 224.
134. Baladjam, [2008] NSWSC at 26-27.
2011] 491
CHICA GO-KENT LAW REVIEW
Where the accused is deemed to be at risk of violence, constraints
within a dock invisible to the jury could be used. One approach, used suc-
cessfully in the New South Wales King Street courts, is a hinged flap that
closes down over the defendant's lap when the person is seated, and can be
locked if required before the jury comes in. 135 These measures prevent all
but the most unusually agile person from getting out of the dock.
In court systems that permit the accused to sit at the bar table, such as
the American system, this seating arrangement avoids the problems listed
above. There are no legislative or security reasons why this configuration
could not be used in the jurisdictions that follow the English model, given
that it has worked successfully in the United States for a century or more.
However it could well be resisted by a legal profession that privileges
communication between prosecution and defense over communication
between defense lawyers and their clients.
C. Designing "Fair" Courtrooms
We have seen how in three rather different legal environments-the
United States, Europe, and Australia-courts have recognized the impact
that the seating arrangements of the accused has on their right to a fair trial.
The built environment of the courtroom is, thus, a human rights issue, one
in which defense lawyers and trial judges have played an important role.
There are ongoing design challenges for meeting the needs of all court
participants. Having enough space to store and display evidence, providing
clear sightlines and adequate acoustics, having fresh air and a safe envi-
ronment-all are part of the minimum standards to which court designers
aspire. Juries, witnesses, and other court participants increasingly are hav-
ing their physical and psychological needs addressed through court design.
There is something more fundamental, however, about the rights of
the accused. Many trials, which might be generally accepted to be fair,
have taken place in cramped surroundings with poor acoustics, limited jury
facilities, and no victim support services. However, a fair trial cannot take
place, as the court rulings discussed in this article suggest, without meeting
certain basic standards for the accused. These include the opportunity of
the accused to consult counsel in confidence, to hear the court proceedings,
to have a place to sit with maximum standards of dignity, to appear uncon-
strained before a jury, and, more generally, to be presented in a way that
preserves the presumption of innocence.
135. Interview with Diane Jones, PTW Architects (lead architect for the King St. courts project),
Sydney, (July 30, 2008).
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The judicial decisions reviewed here have identified how an "unfair"
courtroom affects the rights of the accused, but what would a "fair" cour-
troom look like? Design standards have provided detailed guidance about
enhancing safety and efficiency, but are almost silent on operationalizing
fairness for the accused. Merely removing one barrier does not mean that
the resulting dock arrangements will provide a fair trial.
While any definitive guidelines would require careful investigation
and testing, some general principles can be suggested as a basis for further
consideration:
* Courtrooms should be explicitly designed to promote key com-
munity values, including the presumption of innocence, equality
of arms, transparency, and public access.
* Judges and defense lawyers should be actively involved in the
initial design of courtrooms, not just in relation to their own
needs, but also to obtain their advice about the way defendants
should be accommodated. Other stakeholders, like prosecutors
and victims' and prisoners' groups are also likely to have valua-
ble insights in this consultation process.
* Courtrooms should be flexible enough to be changed for differ-
ent types of trials, with varying levels of security requirements.
Judges and counsel should have the opportunity to have the
courtroom configured within this range of options to provide the
minimum constraints required for each case.
* Defendants should not be constrained in order to address prob-
lems with unruly supporters, witnesses, or other members of the
public. Measures to manage these groups should not result in
barriers between the accused and the jury.
D. Presenting the Accused to the Jury
While most of the debate about how to place the accused in court re-
lates to the rights of the accused, increasingly this is seen through the prism
of the jury-how are jurors likely to react? The inherent dignity of the ac-
cused and the presumption of innocence refers to how the jurors might
perceive these; little matter that the accused might be sitting at the bar table
with a stun belt or in a dock with a locked flap that prevents them from
standing. Even the communication with lawyers was assessed in one of the
cases reviewed by how the jurors would interpret this.
So how do we know how jurors are likely to react? One consistent fea-
ture of all the judgments in the cases reviewed in this article was the lack of
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empirical evidence for the decisions. Judges used their own observations,
plus the views of lawyers, and the opinions of previous judges who had
considered the matter. To some extent this reflects the common law tradi-
tion of using precedent, but it also reflects shared cultural expectations. In
the United States, the dock is "inherently prejudicial," 36 elsewhere it is
not. It is likely that some dock configurations are indeed prejudicial-most
of the English docks reviewed by Mulcahy are likely to fall into that cate-
gory, the nineteenth century fortified constructions as well as contemporary
glassed-in booths.137 However, other configurations for giving the accused
their own designated space in a courtroom might be considered quite res-
pectful. Many newer French courts would fit into this category, with the
accused having a clear vantage point to see and hear all the other partici-
pants and having closer proximity to their advocate, even if some of these
courtrooms have been subsequently disfigured by the introduction of glass
screens.
This comparison suggests that it is not just the design of the dock that
is at issue, but the underlying philosophy of the courtroom. Is the accused
to be presented as a fellow citizen of the jury, in which case the seating
arrangements for the accused should look as similar as possible to that of
the jury? Or is the accused to be put on show and treated as something less
than an equal citizen? Is the person deemed to be a rational subject capable
of giving instructions and being briefed on what is happening, and, if so,
should they be alongside or adjacent to their legal teams? Or are they per-
sons who should be isolated and consulted only when necessary? Are they
part of the circle of humankind and given a place in the action area of the
courtroom, or are they to be relegated to the margins? Juries may make
their decisions partly on the visual impressions they form of the accused,
particularly where the evidence may be evenly balanced. Regardless of
how "worldly" jurors are, they are able to read the architecture of the room
sufficiently to know who is thought by the court to be a dangerous criminal
and who is a fellow citizen entitled to the presumption of innocence.
A comparison of three different traditions of courtroom design allow
us to see the way legal values are written into the physical layout of the
room. The right to consult counsel is best reflected in the French and U.S.
designs that provide for co-location. The presumption of innocence is prob-
ably best represented in the U.S. practice of placing the accused at the bar
table, although an argument can be made for elegant docks that give the
136. See, e.g., Musladin v. Lamarque, 427 F.3d 653, 656 (9th Cir. 2005).
137. LINDA MULCAHY, LEGAL ARCHITECTURE: JUSTICE, DUE PROCESS AND THE PLACE OF LAW,
68-72 (2011).
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accused their own space and emphasize their common humanity with the
jury though consistent materials and design. Meanwhile, the adversarial
nature of the contest is best expressed by French and U.S. designs that sep-
arate the parties, and place the accused in the defense zone rather than iso-
lating them away from the main action of the court.
The designs of courtrooms that place defense lawyers alongside pros-
ecutors and cut them off from their clients-the English model copied in
Australia-is not the product of immemorial tradition, but a nineteenth-
century practice that reflected the interests of the emerging caste of barris-
ters. It is the worst of the three configurations for promoting lawyer-client
dialogue, for preserving the presumption of innocence, and for signifying
that the trial process is a contest rather than a conspiracy. In addition, plac-
ing the accused in a glass cage further undermines the right of accused
persons to a fair trial. If placing a defendant in the dock at all is inherently
prejudicial, then putting a defendant in a glass cage adds yet another layer
of prejudice. This practice is likely to be ended when defense lawyers fol-
low the lead of their Melbourne and Sydney counterparts and ask for the
screens to come down and for dignity to replace fear as the key principle of
courtroom design.
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